Hybrid regulatory bodies have been credited for functioning as an institutional bypass around the bureaucratic procedures and providing expedient responses to the changing needs of administrative governance. As hybrid regulatory bodies are utilized in transnational regulation, however, concerns have arisen over the lack of transparency and the evasion of accountability in the face of the informality and flexibility characteristic of hybrid regulatory bodies. This Article aims to explore the issues surrounding the democratic legitimacy of transnational hybrid administration through a case study of the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee (CSECC) provided in the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, two private legal bodies on behalf of Taiwan and China, respectively. I argue that the CSECC is deliberately designed to avoid the institutional features associated with the idea of publicness. Both traditional constitutional design and global administrative law fall short of restoring the idea of publicness in transnational hybrid administration in the hybrid cross-strait economic regulation. As a result, the idea of publicness is withering away in the cross-strait economic regulation, laying siege to the democratic legitimacy of the extraconstitutional hybrid administration across the Taiwan Strait.

Abstract forthcoming

In late 2011, there have been reports of "almost unimaginable change" to the political environment in Myanmar. Censorship has been relaxed, a number of political prisoners have been released, exiles have been invited to return, and a law permitting independent trade unions has been adopted. These changes have captured the headlines, at least momentarily obscuring the government atrocities reported over the past several decades. Yet reports from Myanmar indicate that government crimes are continuing under the new regime and in fact may be increasing. As recently as September and November 2011, influential international human rights organizations Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have continued to insist that the Myanmar government be held accountable for these crimes. In May and September 2011, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, reported continued widespread violence and abuse, reiterating his call for a United Nations Commission of Inquiry into international crimes in Myanmar.

Under normal circumstances, commencing a criminal case does not require the support of powerful countries, U.N. officials, and human rights groups. Instead, allegations are simply brought to a prosecutor who determines whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed. At the ICC, for instance, typically the Prosecutor will begin an investigation based on the request of a country that is a member of the ICC or on information received from individuals or organizations. No U.N. involvement or stamp of approval is necessary. Myanmar, however, is not a typical case because it has not ratified the founding statute of the ICC (called the Rome Statute). Thus, the ICC has no jurisdiction in Myanmar. Importantly, however, the drafters of the Rome Statute made one crucial exception to this rule: the United Nations Security Council, acting pursuant to its Chapter VII powers related to international peace and security, can "refer" situations in non-signatory countries, like Myanmar, to the ICC. While this exception provides a loophole for those seeking justice in Myanmar, it also politicizes the case. Before anyone can even imagine Myanmar's notorious former ruler, Senior General Than Shwe, on trial at the ICC, the U.N. Security Council must first be convinced to exercise its referral power. The consensus is that China and Russia would almost certainly block any such attempt. In fact, both China and Russia have spoken directly on the issue, strongly denouncing any efforts to commence a U.N. Commission of Inquiry in Myanmar. This article concludes that, to the contrary, China may not be such a sure "no" vote.

This article seeks to evaluate what China's abstention on the referral of Sudan may mean for the impetus for a Commission of Inquiry and referral of Myanmar to the ICC. In particular, the article examines the economic and political risks that China had to accept to abstain on Sudan, and speculates about how those risks would compare with an abstention on Myanmar. China's evolving foreign policy objectives, its voting history on the U.N. Security Council, and its economic and political relationships with Sudan and Myanmar all indicate that today, the opposite of 2005 is true: rather than an abstention surprising anyone, it would be surprising to see China veto a Commission of Inquiry or ICC referral of Myanmar.

China is rapidly becoming the world's largest consumer market. As the number of middle-class Chinese consumers has grown, so too has the size of China's consumer finance system. To date, there has been little scholarship on consumer finance in China. This Article takes a first step at filling this gap in the literature. It argues that China's consumer finance system is fundamentally a tool of the state, which uses "financial repression" of Chinese consumers to acquire capital through shadow taxation. This political-legal system allows reallocation of consumers' capital for political purposes and underwrites China's rapid growth. But cheap consumer capital has primed the Chinese economy for an economic collapse by encouraging unsustainable asset bubbles. Ironically, this very problem makes it impossible for China to liberalize its consumer finance system, lest a shortage of easy capital precipitate a collapse. China's elite are also against financial liberalization because it is not in their personal interest. Ultimately, meaningful liberalization of China's consumer finance system is unlikely because change would require the type of political-legal liberalization which China's government has been unwilling to pursue.